After the fall of Singapore and Japan’s dominance in Southeast Asia, Burma became the final frontier between British India and Imperial Japan. Rangoon was captured in 1942, effectively curtailing supply shipments to China over the Burma Road. This Chinese lifeline was subsequently closed. From 1942 until 1945, British and American policy regarding Burma was focused on expelling the Japanese, but for different reasons.
The fall of Burma and Allied Reaction
1942 was a very good year for the Japanese in the South Pacific. Despite setbacks at the Coral Sea and Midway, 1942 began as a year of unrelenting conquest. Great Britain, the great Asian imperial power, was defeated in every theater of operations. By the late spring, Admiral Nagumo’s bombardment of Ceylon forced the British admiralty to relocate its fractured fleet to Africa.
British India was highly vulnerable as were the Middle East oil fields where most of the Indian Army’s resources were concentrated. Few options existed for the recapture of Burma, however, and British military planners could not decide on the best course of action: whether to focus on Burma, Singapore, or some other vital area. Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s priorities involved, in the long run, the preservation of the empire.
American interests were very different. Burma represented a vital element in the reopening of the Burma Road, an almost obsessive goal of General Joseph Stilwell, serving in Chungking as advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek. Generalissimo Chiang was the leader of the Nationalist Chinese, fighting both the Japanese and the rising Communists in China.
American devotion to Chiang was passionate. China was desperately needed to fight Japan and airbases in China would enable the bombing of Japanese military installations as well as the home islands. Thus, a liberated Burma was essential in ensuring Chiang received necessary supplies. After the Burma Road was closed, supplying Chiang was reduced to flight transports, under the command of General Clair Chennault.